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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS? IRISH AND UK APPROACHES TO STRASBOURG 
JURISPRUDENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Ireland was in some respects a pioneer with regard to the Council of Europe. It was 
one of the first signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; 
the Convention), the first state to recognise the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR; the Strasbourg Court),1 and the first state to be involved in a 
complaint before the ECtHR.2 Yet it subsequently took Ireland some four decades to 
incorporate the ECHR into domestic law.3 In 2003, the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003 (ECHR Act; 2003 Act) was enacted in order for ‘further 
effect to be given, subject to the Constitution, to certain provisions of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’4 Motivated by a 
provision in the Good Friday Agreement requiring Ireland to provide an equivalent 
level of human rights protection as Northern Ireland, the ECHRA 2003 was 
undoubtedly inspired by the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998; 
1998 Act).5  
Yet fundamental differences between the respective states’ constitutional structures 
raise legitimate questions about the appropriateness of such a legal transplant into 
the Irish legal system. While the UK’s HRA 1998 was carefully crafted to avoid 
judicial encroachment upon parliamentary sovereignty, such concerns are absent in 
a legal constitutionalist jurisdiction such as Ireland where the judiciary and 
legislature are comfortable with the power of courts to strike down legislation as 
unconstitutional. Equally, concerns regarding the relationship between entrenched 
constitutional rights and international human rights obligations, such as those found 
in Ireland, are not replicated in a UK-style political constitution.  
                                                 
1 Fiona de Londras and Cliona Kelly, European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact and 
Analysis (Round Hall, 2010) 3-4. 
2 Lawless v Ireland, Judgment of 1 July 1961, 3 ECHR (ser. A, 1961). 
3 Suzanne Egan, “The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003: A Missed Opportunity for 
Domestic Human Rights Litigation’’ (2003) 31(1) Dublin University Law Journal. 230, 231. 
4 ECHRA 2003 long title. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
5 De Londras and Kelly (n. 1) 8.  
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This article examines the obligation, similar in nature, on Irish and UK courts under 
their respective legislative regimes to ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR when interpreting domestic law so as to be compatible with the Convention. 
Irish courts were keen to follow the UK courts’ pronouncements that domestic 
courts should do ‘no more but certainly no less’ than what the ECtHR has decided. 
However, UK courts have more recently supported a shift away from this rigid 
approach to a more flexible attitude towards Strasbourg jurisprudence and, 
additionally, given more recognition to common law rights. The argument advanced 
by the author is that Ireland should follow suit and adopt a form of judicial 
interpretation of rights that creates a more synergistic relationship between its  
Constitution (Bunreacht Na hÉireann) and the ECHR; an approach that would 
maintain the Convention as a floor, not a ceiling of rights protection, in both Ireland 
and the UK.  
The article commences by focusing on the UK’s approach to section 2 of the HRA 
1998 and discusses the evolution of the ‘Mirror Principle’: that UK courts should do 
‘no more but certainly no less’ than what Strasbourg has decided.6 Recent cases 
have, however, suggested the adoption of a more flexible interpretation of this 
Mirror Principle, an approach that is more in keeping with how the operation of the 
HRA was envisaged during its enactment.7 Part II compares and contrasts Ireland’s 
approach to section 4 of the ECHRA – the Irish equivalent of section 2 of the HRA 
1998 – with that of the UK’s. Following this comparison it is noted that Ireland, in 
effect, mirrors the Mirror Principle.8 This ‘copying and pasting’ of the Mirror 
Principle is then appraised in terms of questioning the appropriateness of 
transplanting a principle that was, in essence, a British solution to a British problem 
into Ireland’s legal constitutional structure. This evaluation is also  directed at the 
UK and Irish courts and their viewing of the Convention as a foreign encroachment 
upon the domestic constitutional structure. The UK’s break away from the Mirror 
Principle, while a possibly worrying development from a human rights perspective, 
                                                 
6 On the use of the term ‘the Mirror Principle’ see Jonathan Lewis, ‘’The European Ceiling on Human 
Rights’’ [2007] Public Law 720, 720-721.  
7 Text to n. 33 below. 
8 See Mc D v L [2007] IESC 81. 
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has the potential to pave the way for a more synergistic relationship between the 
common law and the Convention. It is here, however, that the comparison between 
Ireland and the UK breaks down given that the capacity of the ECHR Act 2003 to 
function  as a tool for constitutional interpretation is limited. Nevertheless, Irish 
courts still have the capacity to create a more synergistic relationship between the 
Convention and the Constitution without the necessity  to invoke the ECHR Act 
2003.  
 
PART I 
THE UK APPROACH: THE MIRROR PRINCIPLE 
The HRA 1998 is, both practically and symbolically, a hugely significant 
advancement  in respect of judicial rights protection in the UK.9 The UK’s political 
constitutional structure is sceptical of the judicial protection of rights, particularly 
where such protection amounts to a challenge to the fundamental constitutional 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.10 Rights, according to political constitutional 
theory tend to be invoked in the very areas where there is considerable public 
disagreement as to the correct course of action the state ought to take.11 Instead, 
political constitutionalism conceptualises politics, both normatively and practically, 
as the best sphere within which to resolve these competing claims.12 The HRA 1998, 
therefore, while not a bill of rights in the legal constitutional sense of giving courts 
the power to strike down legislation, nevertheless provides courts with significant 
capacity to vindicate the rights of individuals against the power of the state.13 The 
                                                 
9 Jack Straw and Paul Boateng, ‘‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the ECHR into 
UK Law: A Consultation Paper’’ (1997); Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm, 3782 
(October 1997).  
10 Thus Mark Elliott argues that any theory of judicial review in the UK must reconcile judicial 
protection of the rule of law with parliamentary sovereignty. See Mark Elliott, Constitutional 
Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing, 2001) Ch. 4. 
11 See JAG Griffith ‘’The Political Constitution’’ (1979) 42(1) Modern Law Review 1. 
12See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP, 1999); Richard Bellamy, Political 
Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007); Adam 
Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
13 See generally Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 1-5. Francesca Klug argues that the HRA 1998 satisfies Philip Alston’s three 
characteristics of a Bill of Rights: that they provide protection to those human rights which are 
considered, at a given moment in history, to be of particular importance; they are binding on 
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HRA strikes a balance between competing conceptions of rights by constructing a 
framework for ‘dialogue’ between the legislature and the judiciary with the final say 
resting with the legislature and, as a consequence, preserving the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty.14 UK courts have an obligation, where possible, to 
interpret statutes so as to be compatible with Convention rights and, where this is 
not possible, they have the discretion to issue a declaration of incompatibility.15 This 
declaration does not, however, invalidate the statutory provision in question. 
Furthermore, the HRA 1998 also requires public authorities to act in a manner that is 
compatible with Convention rights and, where they fail to do so, such actions will be 
unlawful.16  
When assessing what the Convention entails, section 2(1) of the HRA 1998 delineates 
the relation between Strasbourg judgments and a domestic court’s duty to follow 
them: 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any— 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
governments and can only be overridden with sufficient difficulty; and that they provide some form 
of redress in the event that violations occur. See Francesca Klug, ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or 
do we already have one? [2007] Public Law 701, 705. 
14 Roger Masterman, ‘’Interpretations, declarations and dialogue: rights protection under the Human 
Rights Act and Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities’’ [2009] Public Law 112, 114-
115. 
15The interpretative obligation is delineated in HRA 1998, s. 3. Declarations of incompatibility are 
made under HRA 1998, s. 4. The HRA 1998 makes a distinction between primary and subordinate 
legislation. Primary legislation is that legislation passed by Parliament in Westminster. Subordinate 
legislation includes, amongst others, statutory instruments enacted by the Scottish Parliament, and 
the assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland; see HRA 1998, s. 21. Unlike primary legislation, 
subordinate legislation can be invalidated by courts under the HRA 1998; see HRA 1998, s. 6. 
16 Courts are also included in this definition of public authority; HRA 1998, s. 6(3)(a). This duty of 
courts to act in a manner compatible with Convention rights has led to the Convention having 
‘indirect horizontal effect’ in disputes between private individuals. See Gavin Phillipson and Alex 
Williams, ‘’Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 878.  
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(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the 
Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is 
relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.17 
 
The key phrase in section 2 is that a court ‘must take into account’ relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. The issue raised by this requirement is the extent to which 
UK courts are actually obliged to follow Strasbourg’s previous judgments. The UK’s 
dominant approach regarding the correct interpretation of section 2 of the HRA 1998 
was set out by Lord Bingham in Ullah v Special Adjudicator18 in which it was held that 
the duty of domestic courts is to ‘’keep pace with Strasbourg jurisprudence as it 
evolves over time: no more but certainly no less’’.19 The latter element of what has 
been termed the Mirror Principle20 – ‘certainly no less’ – is relatively uncontroversial 
from a human rights perspective. Although judgments are only binding on the 
parties in question in a particular case,21 as Lord Bingham notes, the Convention is a 
piece of international law which is ‘authoritatively expounded upon only by the 
Strasbourg court.’22 Strasbourg judgments should, therefore, be followed unless 
there are good reasons to the contrary. For example, a Strasbourg ruling may carry 
less weight if it deals with a subject matter under which contracting parties are 
normally afforded a wide margin of appreciation23 or if the Strasbourg case law is 
dated.24  
What is not on its face clear, however, arising from this apparent supremacy of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, is that aspect of Lord Bingham’s judgment which states 
that domestic courts should do ‘no more’ than what Strasbourg has done to date i.e. 
they should not advance Convention principles further than Strasbourg has already 
                                                 
17 HRA 1998, s. 2(1). 
18  [2004] 2 A.C. 323. 
19 Note 18, 350. 
20 Jonathan Lewis ‘’The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] Public Law 720. 
21 Article 46 ECHR. 
22 Ullah (n. 18) 350. 
23 Re P [2008] UKHL 38. 
24 R (Quila and another) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 45. 
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done. The main basis for supporting this view appears to rest on the need to ensure a 
harmonious interpretation and implementation of the Convention across contracting 
states: 
“It is of course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than those 
guaranteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be the product of 
interpretation of the Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the 
Convention should be uniform throughout the states party to it.”25  
This point is emphasised by Lord Hope in R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department: 
“The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it 
evolves over time. A measure of self-restraint is needed, lest we stretch our 
jurisprudence beyond that which is shared by all the States Parties to the 
Convention.”26 
Aileen Kavanagh further elaborates:  
“If a national court were to depart from a clear and constant line of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, not on the grounds of distinguishing it in light of its application in the 
domestic context, but rather because the national court wished to give a more 
generous interpretation of Convention rights, then this would weaken and dilute the 
authority of the Strasbourg court and undermine the duty of judicial comity which 
exists between the domestic and Strasbourg Courts.”27 
This criticism does not, however, pertain to areas of Convention jurisprudence 
where there is not a clear and constant line of Strasbourg jurisprudence; areas where 
the evolutive nature of the Convention indicate that further development of the case 
law is possible or probable.28 The very notion of a margin of appreciation is reflective 
of the fact that protection afforded to human rights in a given member state may be 
different to that in another.29 It follows that these differences could also amount to a 
                                                 
25 Ullah (n. 18) 350. 
26 [2007] 1 A.C. 484, [49]. 
27 Kavanagh (n. 13) 157.  
28 See text from n. 36 to n. 39 below. 
29 Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737, [57]. With regard to the margin of appreciation and appropriate 
role of the ECtHR as an international court when ruling upon rights obligations in a state, Letsas 
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higher degree of human rights protection in a state. This being the case Kavanagh 
contends that Lord Bingham’s comments regarding the homogeneity of the 
Convention across member states is often misunderstood as meaning that there 
cannot be domestic differences between the manner in which the Convention is 
accommodated in respective states.30 Instead, Kavanagh argues that this is 
fundamentally different from stating that it is within the power of British domestic 
courts to determine the content of Convention rights which would undermine the 
interpretive superiority of the Strasbourg Court. Kavanagh notes that this ‘no more’ 
limitation of Lord Bingham’s statement in Ullah subsequently became as important 
as the ‘certainly no less’ aspect with Lord Brown in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State 
for Defence suggesting that one could invert Lord Bingham’s caveat to read ‘no less 
but certainly no more’.31  
Regarding the argument that the Convention is a floor and not a ceiling for human 
rights protection in a state and that courts should be free to go beyond the 
contemporary limits set by Strasbourg, Lord Bingham, by stating that this should not 
be done by courts through interpretation of the Convention, appears to suggest that 
such is, instead, the job of Parliament. Kavanagh also contends that the argument 
that the Convention is a floor not a ceiling confuses the different roles of the organs 
of government in giving effect to Convention rights. Rather, such an argument 
should be viewed as directed towards the legislature. While Parliament should not 
legislate below the protections afforded by the Convention it is of course free to go 
beyond them. On this point, it is again important to note that the UK has a political 
constitution where parliamentary supremacy is the fundamental principle of 
constitutional law. Whether this interpretation of the ‘floor not a ceiling argument’ is 
applicable to a legal constitutional system which may not be so reticent when it 
comes to judicial innovation will be discussed below in the context of Ireland.32  
                                                                                                                                                        
terms this the ‘structural concept’ of the margin of appreciation. See George Letsas, ‘’Two Concepts of 
the Margin of Appreciation’’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 721-724. 
30 Kavanagh (n. 13) 158.  
31 Note 13, 154.  
32 Note 13; R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 [106] (Lord Brown). 
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The Mirror Principle, in particular Lord Brown’s formulation of ‘no less but certainly 
no more,’ presents a highly constrained approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence. While 
this is laudable from a human rights perspective in preserving the Convention as a 
floor – preventing rights protection in the UK from dropping below what Strasbourg 
stipulates -  the approach is, nonetheless, disappointing in that it appears to prevent 
UK courts from giving Strasbourg the lead. In other words, the approach adopted  
also treats Strasbourg jurisprudence as a ceiling for human rights in the UK. In this 
regard, the Mirror Principle appears to be at variance with how the working of the 
HRA 1998 was envisaged when debated in Parliament.  Lord Irvine, for example, 
remarked that UK courts should be free to give the lead to Europe as well as being 
led.33 
The approach under discussion is also problematic from a more legal-
methodological perspective. Roger Masterman contends that the Mirror Principle is 
ill-equipped to deal with Strasbourg jurisprudence which is not designed to be 
followed in a rigid, black-letter precedent style that is the epitome of the common 
law.34 The classic common law understanding of judgments handed down by higher 
courts as binding upon lower courts is inapposite for Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
Strasbourg judgments often involve the elucidation of  broad principles as distinct 
from focused ratio decidendi. It follows that attempting to extrapolate ratio decedendi 
from Strasbourg cases presents difficulties.  While such broad principles are 
indicative of bills of rights everywhere, the margin of appreciation afforded to 
contracting parties to the ECHR has the effect of limiting its jurisprudence and 
judgments solely to the party involved.35  
 
Through the Looking Glass: A Shift in Direction?  
                                                 
33 HL Debs 18 November 1997, vol. 583, col. 515; Roger Masterman, ‘’Aspiration or Foundation? The 
Status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the ‘Convention rights’ in domestic law’’ in Helen 
Fenwick, Roger Masterman and Gavin Phillipson (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights 
Act (CUP 2007) 57, 66. 
34Note 34, 64. 
35 Note 34. 
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In Re P the House of Lords found that article 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1987, prohibiting an unmarried heterosexual couple from adopting the child 
of the female partner,  violated the right to respect for family life under Article 8 and 
the right to non-discrimination under Article 14 ECHR.36 Although the ECtHR had 
not actually ruled that discriminating on marital status in adoption affairs was a 
violation of the Convention, the House of Lords relied upon Strasbourg 
jurisprudence pertaining to adoption by same sex couples to extrapolate that the 
ECtHR would probably find a violation of the Convention in this instance.37 Re P is, 
thus, an example of the House of Lords going further than Strasbourg had at that 
time. At first glance, this appears to be a departure from the ‘Mirror Principle’s 
stipulation that UK courts should do ‘no more’ than what Strasbourg requires. 
Kavanagh, however, has attempted to reconcile this with the Mirror Principle by 
arguing that the dictum in Ullah was not enunciated in a case which lay within the 
national margin of appreciation.38 Where a case is within the margin of appreciation, 
courts are merely doing what the margin of appreciation requires if they go beyond 
Strasbourg. In light of Re P Kavanagh  presents a much more flexible concept of the 
UK’s approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence.39  
The upper echelons of the UK bench have also signalled additional circumstances 
where Strasbourg jurisprudence may not be followed. In Alconbury, the UK Supreme 
Court suggested that where a judgment of the ECtHR is plainly wrong, UK courts 
should decline to follow it; for example, if following a judgment of the ECtHR would 
result in a conclusion ‘fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under 
the British Constitution’.40 Similarly, in R v Lyons Lord Hoffmann suggested that if 
the ECtHR had misunderstood or been misinformed about certain aspects of English 
                                                 
36 [2008] UKHL 38. 
37 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘’Strasbourg, the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: Who decides about rights 
after Re P?’’ (2009) 72(5) Modern Law Review 828, 829.  
38 Note 38, 833. 
39 Note 38, 834. 
40 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23, [76] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
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law, the House of Lords could issue a judgment that would invite ‘the European 
Court to reconsider the question…[as] there is room for dialogue on such matters’.41 
Such a scenario subsequently arose in R v Horncastle.42 There, the UK Supreme Court 
refused to follow what was arguably a clear and unambiguous line of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. In Horncastle, the applicants argued that hearsay evidence adduced 
during their trial should have been excluded and that their resulting conviction 
amounted to a breach of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. The applicants 
argued that section 3 of the HRA should have been utilised to ‘read down’ the 
relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and exclude the evidence in 
question. By way of strengthening their argument, the applicants pointed to a clear 
line of Strasbourg jurisprudence, in particular the recent case of Al-Khawaja and 
Tahery v United Kingdom in which the ECtHR appeared to declare that a hearsay 
statement which amounted to the sole or decisive evidence against a defendant 
would breach Article 6.43 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously refused to 
follow this line of jurisprudence on the grounds that the ECtHR failed to 
accommodate the nuances of the British domestic criminal trial proceedings: 
“The requirement to “take into account” the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally 
result in this Court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg 
Court. There will, however, be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to 
whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates 
particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to this 
court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this 
course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to reconsider the 
particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may 
prove to be a valuable dialogue between this court and the Strasbourg Court. This is 
such a case.”44 
The Court continued: 
                                                 
41 R v Lyons (No.3) [2003] 1 A.C. 976 [46].  
42 [2009] UKSC 14. 
43 (2009) 49 EHRR 1; Liz, Heffernan, “Hearsay in Criminal Trials: The Strasbourg Perspective” (2013) 
49 Irish Jurist 132; Lord Kerr, “The Conversation between Strasbourg and National Courts – Dialogue 
or Dictation” (2009) 44 Irish Jurist 1, 9-11;  
44 Note 43, [11]. 
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“In these circumstances I have decided that it would not be right for this court to 
hold that the sole or decisive test should have been applied rather than the 
provisions of the 2003 Act, interpreted in accordance with their natural meaning. I 
believe that those provisions strike the right balance between the imperative that a 
trial must be fair and the interests of victims in particular and society in general that 
a criminal should not be immune from conviction where a witness, who has given 
critical evidence in a statement that can be shown to be reliable, dies or cannot be 
called to give evidence for some other reason. In so concluding I have taken careful 
account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg 
Court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or 
decisive test in this case.”45 
It is clear from these observations that the emphasis on dialogue between the 
domestic courts and Strasbourg seeks to preserve the comity between the two courts. 
UK courts when departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence will seek to engage in a 
conversation with their Strasbourg counterparts rather than to defy them outright 
What emerges from these cases is that UK courts are now taking a much more 
flexible approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence than that suggested by the initial 
formulation of the Mirror Principle enunciated in Ullah.  
 
The Rise of the Common Law 
More recently, a further shift in the UK approach to the HRA 1998 is evident in the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on grounding  the protection of rights in the common 
law. In Osborn v Parole Board three prisoners challenged by way of judicial review the 
decisions of the Parole Board which were reached after refusing the applicants an 
oral hearing. 46 While the applicants were ultimately successful, Lord Reed held that 
they had erred in law by basing their claim primarily upon Article 5(4) of the 
Convention and not upon the UK’s rich tapestry of administrative law pertaining to 
fair procedures. Such an approach did not accurately reflect the relationship between 
Convention rights and domestic law:  
                                                 
45 Note 43, [108]. 
46  [2013] UKSC 61.  
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“The values underlying both the Convention and our own constitution require that 
Convention right should be protected primarily by a detailed body of domestic law. 
The Convention taken by itself is too inspecific to provide the guidance which is 
necessary in a state governed by the rule of law… The Convention cannot therefore 
be treated as if it were Moses and the prophets. On the contrary, the European court 
has often referred to “the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention””.47 
The Court continued: 
“The importance of the [Human Rights] Act is unquestionable. It does not however 
supersede the protection of human rights under the common law or statute, or create 
a discrete body of law based upon the judgments of the European Court. Human 
rights continue to be protected by our domestic law, interpreted and developed in 
accordance with the act when appropriate.”48  
Similar sentiments were echoed by the UK Supreme court in A v BBC.49 There, the 
BBC sought to challenge an order made by the Court of Upper Session to allow the 
applicant to amend his application for judicial review by substituting his name with 
letters of the alphabet. A had been convicted of sexual offences against his step-
daughter and was challenging his deportation on the grounds that there was a real 
risk to his life or that he would be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment in the event that he was deported and that this information was disclosed. 
The order made to withhold A’s name and replace it with letters was, so the BBC 
contended, made under a common law power. The BBC argued that any common 
law power which might previously have been exercised in such circumstances were 
superseded by Convention rights, specifically in this instance the right to freedom of 
expression contained in Article 10. In examining the relationship between the 
Convention and the common law, Lord Reed expressly rejected this, noting that the 
common law principle of open justice remains in vigour even when Convention 
rights are also applicable. Lord Reed again affirmed Osborn and the importance of 
the continued development of the common law.  
                                                 
47
 Note 46 [56]. 
48
 Note 46 [57]. 
49 [2014] 2 W.L.R. 1243. 
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Again, in Kennedy v Information Commissioner,50 Lord Mance pronounced upon the 
relationship between the Convention and the common law specifically regarding the 
protection of free speech and Article 10 of the Convention:  
“In some areas, the common law may go further than the Convention, and in some 
contexts it may also be inspired by the Convention rights and jurisprudence (the 
protection of privacy being a notable example). And in time, of course, a synthesis 
may emerge. But the natural starting point in any dispute is to start with domestic 
law, and it is certainly not to focus exclusively on Convention rights, without 
surveying the wider common law scene.”51  
Lord Justice Laws in the Court of Appeal took further exception to the Mirror 
Principle in R (on the application of the Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v Secretary 
of State for Justice expressing the wish that:  
    “…It is with great deference to the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, that I hope the 
Ullah principle may be revisited. There is a great deal to be gained from the 
development of a municipal jurisprudence of the Convention rights, which the 
Strasbourg court should respect out of its own doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation, and which would be perfectly consistent with our duty to take account 
of (not to follow) the Strasbourg cases. It is a high priority that the law of human 
rights should be, and be seen to be, as sure a part of our domestic law as the law of 
negligence. If the road to such a goal is clear, so much the better.”52 
These recent judicial pronouncements  appear to reassert the role of the common law 
as a source of rights. In this regard, it may be possible that UK courts will begin to 
expand upon these common law rights faster than Strasbourg expands its equivalent 
jurisprudence. Such an approach has the potential to reflect Ronald Dworkin’s initial 
conception of how a UK bill of rights might work before the HRA 1998 was enacted: 
                                                 
50 Note 49, 808. 
51 Note 49, 835 [46]. 
52 [2013] EWCA Civ 34. 
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“British judges could certainly adopt… a more generous interpretation, using the 
rich and special traditions of the British Common Law to develop out of the 
Convention a particularly British view of the fundamental rights of citizens in a 
democratic society.”53 
Dworkin, it may be said, envisaged a synergistic relationship between the common 
law and the Convention, where each could feed into the other producing a distinctly 
British dimension to the protection of human rights. The above cases, however, 
cannot be read as giving effect to Dworkin’s vision. Instead, these cases appear to 
view the common law and the ECHR as separate streams of rights protection with 
the common law to be preferred to the Human Rights Act when this is possible. That 
conceded, the Supreme Court in A v BBC did expressly state that the development of 
the common law can also be influenced by the ECHR.54 
A synthesis between the common law and the Convention could as a consequence be 
facilitated by abandoning the overly constraining Mirror Principle. This would allow 
UK courts to correctly conceptualise Strasbourg jurisprudence as a floor, not a 
ceiling, for rights protection. It would free courts from rigidly following the 
pronouncements of Strasbourg so as to give UK human rights jurisprudence not 
only a distinctly British flavour but, in addition, the capacity to develop and advance 
it beyond what Strasbourg has currently grappled with to date. This approach 
would be more in keeping with how the Convention ideally operates. It views 
human rights law not as a foreign imposition but as an integral part of a domestic 
legal system, reflecting pre-existing legal principles and helping with their 
development. 
 
Challenging the floor? 
This recent judicial trend in emphasising the common law as distinct from the 
Convention cannot be looked at without contextualising it within the political 
debates taking place in the UK concerning its relationship with Strasbourg. Euro-
                                                 
53 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (Chatto and Windus, 1990) 22; Masterman (n. 33 ) 58.  
54 A v BBC (n. 49) 1257 [40]. 
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scepticism in the UK is not just reserved for the European Union (EU) and its 
institutions, but also for the ECHR, which often arises as a result of confusion in 
treating both the EU and the Council of Europe as one and the same.55  Campaigning 
for repeal of the HRA or withdrawal from the ECHR56 is heightened when the 
ECtHR issues judgments that are seen to be particularly counter-majoritarian.57 The 
election of a Conservative majority in 2015 has placed the future of the HRA in 
doubt given pre-election promises to scrap the HRA and to replace it with a British 
Bill of Rights.58 Emphasising the role of the common law in protecting civil liberties 
can, then, be seen as the UK courts drawing its battle lines in the event of  a repeal of 
the HRA. So, even if such repeal or withdrawal were to happen, the UK courts will 
still have recourse to a domestic body of rights protection emanating from the 
common law.59 
Extra-judicial comments made by various judges  suggest that Euro-scepticism may 
also be exerting an influence on judicial thinking. In November 2013, shortly after 
Osborn was decided, Lord Sumption expressed dissatisfaction with the ever-
                                                 
55 See e.g. Macer Hall, ‘’MPs’ defiance on prison votes “a turning point in our history’’’ The Express (11 
February 2011) where the headline story of the newspaper in question that day conflated the ECtHR 
with the paper’s ‘crusade to get Britain out of the EU.’  
56 In October 2014, the Conservative Party published its plans for repeal of the HRA 1998 and its 
replacement with a UK style ‘bill of rights’ and an express statement that the UK can disregard 
judgments of the 
ECtHR:<http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHT
S.pdf> accessed 7 October 2014.  
57 ECtHR judgments on such counter-majoritarian issues may be seen in Hirst v UK No.2 [2005] ECHR 
681 where the ECtHR found that an absolute ban on prisoner voting violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of 
the ECHR pertaining to the right to free elections; and Vinter and others v United Kingdom App Nos 
66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Grand Chamber Judgment of 9 July 2013, where whole life orders 
committing an individual to prison for life without the possibility of parole violated Article 3 and the 
absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. For an analysis of Vinter see 
Natasa Mavronicola, ‘’Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution’’ 
(2014) 77(2) Modern Law Review 292. 
58 A pledge to introduce a new bill of rights was included in the Queen’s Speech made to Parliament 
on 27 May 2015. See ‘Queen’s Speech 2015’ (27 May 2015) available at: < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015> accessed 8 September 2015. For a 
summary of the implications and legal impediments of a repeal of the HRA see Kanstantsin 
Dzehtsiarou, Tobias Locke, Paul Johnson, Fiona de Londras, Alan Greene and Ed Bates, ‘’The Legal 
Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European 
Convention on Human Rights’’ (May 12, 2015). Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605487> accessed 1 September 2015. 
59 Roger Masterman and Se-Shauna Wheatle, ‘A common law resurgence of rights protection?’ [2015] 
EHRLR 57, 61. 
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encroaching role of the ECtHR and indeed domestic courts in questions of public 
policy. In particular, Lord Sumption stressed that:  
“The treatment of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights as a 
“living instrument” allows it to make new law in respects which are not 
foreshadowed by the language of the Convention and which Parliament would not 
necessarily have anticipated when it passed the Act.”60 
Lord Sumption’s arguments are by no means new but are, instead, re-assertions of 
classic political constitutionalist conceptions of rights as inherently political issues 
which society disagrees over.61 In light of Lord Sumption’s comments, and the wider 
political debate over the future of the HRA 1998 and the UK’s relation with 
Strasbourg, to claim that the departure from the Mirror Principle can only be a good 
thing from a human rights perspective would constitute a rather rose-tinted view of 
the current debate in the UK.  
 
PART II 
THE IRISH APPROACH: MIRRORING THE MIRROR PRINCIPLE 
The Irish equivalent of section 2 of the HRA 1998 is section 4 of the ECHRA 2003: 
Judicial notice shall be taken of the Convention provisions and of— 
(a) any declaration, decision, advisory opinion or judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights established under the Convention on any question in 
respect of which that Court has jurisdiction, 
(b) any decision or opinion of the European Commission of Human Rights so 
established on any question in respect of which it had jurisdiction, 
(c) any decision of the Committee of Ministers established under the Statute 
of the Council of Europe on any question in respect of which it has 
jurisdiction, 
                                                 
60 Lord Sumption ‘’The Limits of Law’’ (27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 
2013) < https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf> accessed, 15 September 2014, 11. 
61Griffith (n. 11).  
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and a court shall, when interpreting and applying the Convention provisions, take 
due account of the principles laid down by those declarations, decisions, advisory 
opinions, opinions and judgments. 
De Londras and Kelly note that the section does not elaborate on whether or not 
there is a distinction between ‘judicial notice’ and ‘due account’ although they 
suggest that prima facie the latter both incorporates the former and imposes a 
further, somewhat higher, burden on courts than does judicial notice.62  
The principal case regarding section 4 of the ECHRA 2003 and the duty to take ‘due 
account’ of Strasbourg jurisprudence is Mc D v L.63 That case involved the 
interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR and the right to respect for private and family 
live. PL and BM were a lesbian couple in a committed relationship and PL had 
conceived through the use of a sperm donor – Mc D, a family friend and gay man. 
Mc D agreed that he would play the role of a favourite uncle in the child’s life but he 
would not be a father. However, when PL and BM made plans to move to Australia 
with their child, Mc D then sought to be appointed a guardian of the child with a 
right of access. PL and BM argued that this would infringe upon their rights as an 
autonomous family unit. As the two women and their child did not fit the 
constitutional definition of a family, they sought to rely on Article 8 of the 
Convention, arguing that they ought to have rights equivalent to that of a family. 
Hedigan J. in the High Court then proceeded to consider whether PL and BM 
together with the child constituted ‘a family’ or, as he put it, a ‘de facto family,’ so as 
to benefit from the legal status and rights conferred on a family by Article 8 of the 
Convention.64 The ECtHR had not, however, at the time expressly stated that same 
sex couples could come within the protection afforded to de facto families under 
Article 8 of the Convention. Hedigan J., however, identified a trend in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR which suggested that that the Court’s jurisprudence was 
moving in this direction. The judge, relying on section 4 of the ECHRA 2003,  took 
                                                 
62 De Londras and Kelly (n. 1) 162. 
63 [2009] IESC 81. 
64 Note 62, [39]-[43] (Denham J.). 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence into account and advanced it beyond the protections that 
the ECtHR had itself stated it covered at that point in time.  
The Supreme Court, however, overturned this determination on two grounds. 
Firstly, the interpretative duty under section 4 of the ECHRA 2003 necessarily 
requires a law to interpret. Hedigan J. did not state what law he was interpreting. 
Rather, he was attempting to fill a lacuna in Irish law by referring directly to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Consequently, Hedigan J. could not invoke section 4 of 
the ECHRA 2003 as there was no rule of law or legislation to interpret. Instead, what 
this amounted to was a direct application of the Convention in a manner that was 
constitutionally prohibited.65 More relevant to the topic of this article is the second 
ground on which the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the High Court i.e. 
the correct approach that is to be taken to section 4 of the ECHRA 2003. In this 
regard Fennelly J. expressly endorsed the approach taken by Lord Bingham in Ullah: 
“…It is of course open to Member States to provide for rights more generous than 
those guaranteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be the product of 
interpretation of the Convention by national Courts, since the meaning of the 
Convention should be uniform throughout the States party to it. The duty of national 
Courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no 
more, but certainly no less”.66 
De Londras and Kelly note that Fennelly J.’s judgment places particular emphasis on 
the dualist approach Ireland takes to international law.67It should be noted that 
Denham J.’s judgment in the case also stresses Ireland’s dualist structure, where she 
quotes from Maguire C.J.’s judgment in Re Ó Laighléís and notes the fact that at the 
time that case was decided, the Convention, at the choice of the Oireachtas, had not 
been transposed into domestic law.68 Thus, when the ECHR Act 2003 was passed, 
the Act did not give direct effect to the Convention but only permitted courts to: 
                                                 
65 Mc D v L (n. 63) [87] – [88] (Fennelly J.);.de Londras and Kelly (n. 1) 163.  
66
 Mc D v L (n. 63) [100] (Fennelly J.). 
67 De Londras and Kelly (n. 1) 180. 
68 [1960] 1 I.R. 93; Mc D v L (n 63) [66] (Denham J.). 
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“…apply the provisions of the Convention, in the interpretation and application of 
any statutory provision or rule of law, insofar as it is possible to do so in accordance 
with the established canons of construction and interpretation.”69  
What Hedigan J. had attempted to do instead was to apply the Convention directly. 
This was something, according to the Supreme Court, which the Oireachtas had 
taken the positive step  not to permit. 
Mc D v L thus ‘copies and pastes’ the Mirror Principle as enunciated by Lord 
Bingham into Irish law. However, it does so in a case that, due to the rights involved, 
ought to lie within Ireland’s margin of appreciation.70 The nuances in Lord 
Bingham’s dicta, clarified by the House of Lords in Re P – that UK Courts can go 
beyond Strasbourg if the issue lies within its margin of appreciation – appear to have 
been lost on the Irish Supreme Court.71 Indeed, the similarities with which Hedigan 
J. constructed his judgment based on Strasbourg jurisprudence, and the manner in 
which the House of Lords delivered its judgment in Re P are striking. A key 
difference is that Re P, involved a norm of positive law whereas, as stated 
previously, in Mc D v L, Hedigan J. was trying to fill a lacuna in Irish law.72  
 
The Dangers of outpacing Strasbourg 
Ullah was decided in 2004, four years after the entry into force of the HRA 1998. 
Prior to this, courts and judges were unused to engaging in robust substantive 
review of the exercise of public functions and, in particular, the notion of striking 
down legislation as incompatible with a higher system of norms was one that UK 
courts were unfamiliar with.73 It is unsurprising that in these circumstances the UK 
                                                 
69 Mc D v L (n. 63) [70], quoting with approval McKechnie J. in T v O [2007] IEHC 326 (Denham J.). 
70 However, see text to n. 80 below where it is noted that de Londras and Kelly suggest that the 
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Irish law with respect to ‘de facto families’.  
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72 Text to n. 65. 
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courts took a precautionary approach to judicial innovation in the early years of the 
HRA 1998. Applying Strasbourg jurisprudence in a precedent-like manner, as if it 
were a higher court in a common law structure, as distinct from advancing a novel 
construction of Convention obligations is potentially symptomatic of this, rather 
than concerns about the dangers of outpacing Strasbourg. Indeed, once Lord 
Bingham, the key architect of the Mirror Principle,  retired, cracks in this principle 
began to appear.  
What dangers there actually are, however, in out-pacing Strasbourg are limited. No 
threat to the legitimacy of the Convention or the ECtHR arises when domestic courts 
or legislatures go beyond what the ECtHR has decided to date. As stated previously, 
Kavanagh does suggest that domestic courts going beyond where Strasbourg has 
gone to date may undermine the principle of judicial comity and challenge the 
legitimacy of the ECtHR. However, this danger can be assuaged if it is done so in a 
constructive manner through a process of judicial dialogue, rather than through 
judicial confrontation.74 In turn, this advancement of Convention rights beyond what 
Strasbourg has done to date can also assist the ECtHR with the evolutive nature of 
the Convention through the building of consensus. Consensus acts as a means 
through which the ECtHR can interpret and advance the Convention in a legitimate 
manner that can mitigate what Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou terms the ‘surprise effect’ of 
novel ECtHR judgments.75 
 Relatedly, the risk to the legitimacy of the ECtHR through domestic legislatures 
advancing human rights norms beyond those protected by the Convention is 
minimal. Kavanagh and Lord Bingham acknowledge as much when stating that it is 
for Parliament to go beyond the ‘irreducible minimum’ laid down by Strasbourg. 76 
Thus, the issue of doing ‘no more’ than what Strasbourg has set out is not necessarily 
one of respecting Strasbourg but, rather, one that pertains to the appropriate 
                                                 
74 Text to n. 40 above.  
75 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’’ (2011) 12 (10) German Law Journal 1730; Kanstantsin 
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function of the UK judiciary in a political constitution. These concerns, therefore, 
ought not to arise  in a legal constitutionalist system such as Ireland’s. None of the 
Supreme Court judgments in Mc D v L address the political constitutional structure 
of the UK and how this may influence a precautionary approach on the part of UK 
courts when exercising their authority under the HRA. The Oireachtas can, of 
course, advance human rights principles beyond the minimum set by Strasbourg 
and there is no reason from a domestic constitutional perspective why Irish courts 
could not do so as well. Endorsement of the Mirror Principle in Mc D v L rests 
primarily upon the dualist nature of Ireland’s approach to international law and 
judicial comity between Irish courts and Strasbourg. It is hard to see, however, how 
Irish courts, by adopting a more adventurous construction of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, would somehow infringe upon Ireland’s dualist approach to 
international law. As long as courts are using the ECHRA 2003 to interpret a legal 
provision rather than attempting to fill a lacuna in Irish law by referring to the 
Convention, the Convention is not being directly applied. This is so even if Irish 
courts interpret the Convention in a more generous manner than Strasbourg has to 
date.  
Moreover, judicial comity between Irish courts and Strasbourg would not be 
undermined as the development of Convention principles by domestic courts 
beyond what Strasbourg has stated is potentially the desired role that the ECtHR 
would like national courts to take. The Court has consistently stressed its subsidiary 
role in protecting Convention rights. The Interlaken Declaration in 2010, for 
example, reiterated the subsidiary nature of the Court as a supervisory mechanism, 
emphasising instead that the implementation of the Convention at the domestic level 
be a priority and the importance of taking Strasbourg jurisprudence into account in 
areas where the Court’s jurisprudence is developing and where the same problem of 
principle exists within their own legal system. 77 The Brighton Declaration in 2012 
again repeated the call for domestic courts to take into account Strasbourg 
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jurisprudence and become the main implementation mechanism of the Convention, 
emphasising that appropriate incorporation of the Convention in domestic law 
would help reduce the substantial caseload of the ECtHR.78  
These statements are not calling for the abdication of the Court’s functions. Nor must 
they be seen solely as recognition of the fact that member states may disagree as to 
what certain rights may entail. Rather, they emphasise that the ECtHR does not have 
a monopoly on advancing Convention rights. In the case of Mc D v L no conflict 
would have arisen between the domestic court’s interpretation of Article 8 and 
Strasbourg’s as the domestic court’s interpretation did not contradict or challenge 
anything Strasbourg had decided. Consequently, while Hedigan J.’s use of section 4 
of the ECHRA 2003 was deemed to be incorrect in that  there was no law for him to 
interpret, his approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence was in line with what the ECtHR 
and the other organs of the Council of Europe have repeatedly suggested is 
desirable. While the judge’s interpretation did go beyond what Strasbourg had 
decided to date ‘going beyond’ is distinct from ‘going against’. There is a 
fundamental difference between issuing a ruling that is clearly at variance with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, and a ruling which reaches a  destination earlier than that 
which Strasbourg was  heading towards. If, for example, the Supreme Court ruled 
against McD and Mc D had brought his grievance to Strasbourg, he would 
essentially be required to argue that the Convention provided a lower level of 
protection than what the domestic court decided it did.79 Strasbourg would be 
highly unlikely to make such a finding because of  the margin of appreciation which 
attaches to the protection of privacy and family life, and also because of  the 
evolutive nature of the Convention. De Londras and Kelly acknowledge that Mc D v 
L was a decision in an area of particular sensitivity in both Ireland and the UK and 
suggest that where the  area of law  is less contentious, the Irish courts may be 
                                                 
78 Recent reforms in the Court’s structure have also considerably helped to tackle this backlog, .e.g 
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willing to adopt a more flexible approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence. However this 
‘remains to be seen’.80 That conceded, for Irish courts to assert that Strasbourg has a 
monopoly on Convention interpretation to the extent that domestic courts cannot 
advance human rights protection beyond what Strasbourg has decided is a striking 
abdication of national authority.  
What is clear from the formulation of the Mirror Principle, the courts’ subsequent 
departure from it, and the debate regarding the future of HRA 1998, is the acute 
political tightrope the judiciary in the UK must walk when applying Convention 
principles. While the legitimacy of judicial review and the fine line between 
interpreting and legislating is one which all legal systems face, the entrenched nature 
of the judicial role in rights protection in legal constitutional structures, compared to 
that of  the UK courts under the HRA 1998, tends to confer more legitimacy on them. 
Tensions arising from particularly contentious judicial decisions may result, for 
example, in ‘packing courts’ with appointees who are sympathetic to the 
Government of the day’s political outlook with a view to one day over-turning the 
contentious judicial system in question.81 Alternatively, in a system like Ireland’s, a 
referendum to amend the Constitution may be called. What is not a realistic 
prospect, however, is the potential removal of such strike down powers. 
 
Outpacing the Constitution? 
Arguably, the only issue with respect to outpacing Strasbourg that would be unique 
to the Irish, as opposed to the UK constitutional situation, is that human rights 
protection under the ECHRA 2003 could potentially outpace the Constitution. When 
courts approach the interpretation of statutes they must, in accordance with section 2 
of the 2003 Act, do so in a manner that is compatible with the state’s obligations 
under the provisions of the Convention. It is the case, of course, that they must also 
construe statues so that they are compatible with the Irish Constitution.82 If Hedigan 
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J.’s approach in Mc D v L were followed, the protection afforded to so-called same-
sex de facto family units would not enjoy constitutional status. While legal norms 
would have to be interpreted in order to protect such de facto families, where this 
would be impossible, the offending norm would not be struck down as 
unconstitutional and rendered invalid. Instead only a declaration of incompatibility 
with the Convention would be possible. Such a victory would be a pyrrhic one as the 
norm would nevertheless remain valid. The judgment in Carmody v Minister for 
Justice has alleviated this risk somewhat in stating that judges should assess the 
constitutionality of a statute first before considering whether to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility pursuant to section 5 of the ECHRA 2003.83 
There is still a risk, however, that the interpretive obligation under the ECHRA 2003 
could potentially hamper the development of Irish constitutional human rights 
protection. If there are two separate interpretations of a legislative provision, both 
constitutional but only one compatible with Convention principles, then this 
Convention compatible interpretation prevails.84 The material outcome is the same 
in that Convention principles are given effect to and the standard of Irish human 
rights protection increased. However, the development of Irish constitutional 
jurisprudence on human rights has been hampered. The higher degree of human 
rights protection derives its legal validity from the 2003 Act, rather than from 
constitutional human rights jurisprudence.  
Having acknowledged this concern it should also be noted that it would not have 
arisen in Mc D v L given the nature of Irish constitutional jurisprudence on the 
protection of family life and that it is highly unlikely that the Irish Constitution as it 
read at the time could ever be interpreted to give protection to same-sex de facto 
families. Moreover, to avoid this, Irish judges could seek to forge a greater synthesis 
between the Convention and the Constitution. This would avoid a scenario similar 
to the as yet under-developed synthesis between the common law and the 
Convention in the UK.85  
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A synthesis between the Convention and the Irish Constitution?  
Gerard Hogan (now Hogan J.) predicted back in 2006 that ‘in a manner similar to 
Germany, ECHR-jurisprudence will simply be grafted on to existing constitutional 
jurisprudence.’86 If this were to be the approach taken, then the chances of a 
domestic stream of rights based on the ECHR out-pacing the Constitution would be 
mitigated. While Irish courts were initially sceptical of this argument, Suzanne Egan 
has noted that judicial attitudes towards Strasbourg have softened considerably and 
is reflected in the routine citing of Convention jurisprudence in the interpretation of 
constitutional rights.87 
Germany, however, may not be an ideal comparator as its constitution 
acknowledges the concept of dignity is at the apex of its hierarchy of norms.88 This, 
argues Frank Hoffmeister, in conjunction with the legislative enactment of the ECHR 
into domestic law in accordance with Article 59(2) of the Basic Law which ‘bridges 
the gap’ between domestic and international law explains why the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) has been so 
accepting of Strasbourg jurisprudence.89 As a result German constitutional theory  is 
very comfortable with judicial invalidation of legal norms on human rights issues, 
arguably even more so than Ireland. Indeed, it has been postulated that certain 
constitutional norms could also be invalidated if they conflict with the notion of 
dignity, i.e. unconstitutional constitutional norms are a possibility in Germany.90 Be 
that as it may, Christian Tomuschat has observed that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
has never accepted the notion propounded by certain writers that because of the 
particular importance which the Basic Law attributes to human rights, the relevant 
international treaties, in particular the ECHR, should be acknowledged as 
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instruments enjoying constitutional authority.91 Nevertheless, with the Convention 
enjoying only legislative, not constitutional status in Germany, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has not been reluctant in interpreting the Basic Law of 
Germany in harmony with the ECHR.  
This is not the place for a detailed exposition of German constitutional theory. It  
suffices to say, however, that Irish judges may be reluctant to follow their German 
counterparts, particularly if the justification for so doing is the transposition of the 
Convention into domestic law through the ECHR Act 2003. Such an argument does 
not align with an understanding of the Irish legal system’s hierarchy of norms 
whereby lower order norms such as legislation ought to be interpreted compatibly 
with higher order constitutional norms and not vice-versa. Mr. Justice John Murray, 
writing extra-judicially in 2008, suggested that the ECHR could be used in 
constitutional interpretation in a  manner similar to other sources of comparative 
law such as the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.92 Whereas Hoffmeister 
suggests that the German legislation incorporating the ECHR ‘bridges the gap’ 
between domestic law and international law, paving the way for the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to interpret the German Basic Law consistently with the 
Convention,93the position in Ireland is that 
“[A]lthough the courts may of course on their own initiative have regard to 
Convention case law in constitutional cases as they have done prior to the entry into 
force of the Act, they are under no obligation to do so. Incorporation of the ECHR 
into Irish law under the 2003 Act therefore precludes the Convention acting, like a 
‘cuckoo in the nest’ to supplant the Constitution in the national legal order.”94 
Murray C. J. thus rejected the argument that section 4 of the ECHR Act affects ‘the 
interpretation of the Constitution (nor could it).’95 This falls significantly lower  than 
the level of synthesis  achieved between the German Basic Law and the Convention. 
Indeed, it seems to be much lower than the ‘grafting on’ of Convention principles 
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into the Constitution imagined by Hogan. Murray C.J.  appears, then, to suggest that 
the Convention is no more persuasive as an aid to constitutional law than US 
Supreme Court judgments; a distinct approach that is different to that taken by 
Germany.  
There is ultimately nothing, however, notwithstanding the weaknesses in the 
comparison drawn between Germany and Ireland, to prevent the judiciary from 
developing the interpretive approach envisaged by Hogan J. Indeed, that judge 
points to the judgment in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Gormley to 
suggest that this may now be happening.96 There, the Supreme Court held that the 
‘living nature’ of the due process guarantee in Article 28.1 of the Constitution 
requires that a suspect be entitled to consult a lawyer, at least in advance of 
questioning. The court found it unnecessary to consult the 2003 Act.97 
 As the Irish Constitution is a ‘living and breathing document’ that protects both 
enumerated and unenumerated rights, it is inevitable that the international human 
rights principles that the state signs up to and gives effect to, and the domestic duties 
prescribed in the Constitution, come into close proximity with each other. This 
‘culture of rights’ should, like the common law and the HRA 1998, enmesh together 
in a more synergistic relationship, to impart a uniquely Irish character to human 
rights jurisprudence. As long as such rights protection does not drop below the floor 
set by Strasbourg, there is no legal impediment to this synergy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
De Londras has remarked that the Irish transplantation of the UK-pioneered 
declaration of incompatibility in the HRA 1998 is an ‘awkward fit’.98 A declaration of 
incompatibility, she argues, is designed to increase political engagement in areas of 
rights contestability. It is a measure that is bespoke to a political constitutional 
system where parliament is sovereign and courts must take a back seat. While the 
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 [2014] IESC 17; Gerard Hogan, “The Constitution and the Convention: Happily Married or a Loveless Co-
existence?” in Suzanne Egan, Liam Thornton and Judy Walsh (eds), Ireland and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: 60 Years and Beyond (Bloomsbury 2014) 73, 74. 
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 Note 94. 
98 Fiona de Londras, ‘’Declarations of Incompatibility under the ECHR Act 2003: A Workable 
Transplant?’’ (2014) 35(1) Statute Law Review 50, 60.  
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declaration of incompatibility power may well be an awkward fit, the 
transplantation of Lord Bingham’s Mirror Principle is even more so.  
The method by which Ireland incorporated the ECHR into domestic law leaves a lot 
to be desired.99 While closely based on the UK’s HRA, the Irish judiciary’s uncritical 
acceptance  of Lord Bingham’s Mirror Principle was certainly not inevitable. 
Although the Mirror Principle is more suitable to a political constitution it, too, is not 
a certainty given the recent judicial shift towards common law protection of human 
rights. It remains to be seen whether the Irish judiciary will countenance a similar 
shift away from the Mirror Principle towards a more holistic, synergistic relationship 
between Constitutional and Convention rights. The ECHR Act 2003 cannot, 
however, be a source for such a synergistic relationship. Rather, such a shift should 
be embedded by intertwining the ‘evolutive’ and subsidiary nature of the 
Convention with the similarly evolutive enumerated and unenumerated rights in the 
Irish Constitution.  
 
                                                 
99 The author agrees with Suzanne Egan’s description of the ECHRA 2003 as a ‘missed opportunity 
for human rights litigation.’ Egan (n. 87). 
